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 Dramatic changes have taken place in the nation’s mortgage lending markets in 
recent years.  Passage of the Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) in 1977, en-
forcement of the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and compliance with a range of 
local, state, and national fair lending rules have increased access to credit for many 
households and communities long denied conventional financial services.  But within 
the past decade the rise in subprime and predatory lending has put many families 
and neighborhoods in financial jeopardy as default and foreclosure rates are skyrock-
eting, particularly in minority and low income areas.  Fingers are pointed in several 
directions: greed on the part of families trying to buy homes they could not afford, 
lax underwriting by originators, inaccurate appraisals, fraudulent practices by invest-
ment bankers, inattention by regulators, and more.  Community groups, elected 
officials, bank regulators, and mortgage lenders themselves are debating over how 
the nation should respond. 
 Lost amidst recent debates is the central role that surging economic inequality 
has played.  The concentration of income and wealth at the top coupled with the 
concentration of poverty have nurtured significant increases in subprime and preda-
tory lending among vulnerable communities.  Strengthening the CRA and enforcing 
its provisions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for ameliorating the crises 
created by recent lending practices.  Broader, macro-economic policies that directly 
address various trajectories of economic inequality must complement progressive 
banking and bank regulatory reforms if emerging challenges are to be met.  This 
article examines the impact of inequality on subprime and predatory lending and of-
fers a range of policy responses to the emerging problems confronting urban 
communities across the country. 
 The following section documents the growing polarization in the distribution of 
income and wealth.  The consequences of such patterns are explored in the subse-
quent section.  This is followed by a review of the impact of uneven development on 
financial services.  The article concludes with a discussion of the public policies and 
private practices that created the uneven development and proposes alternatives that 
can ameliorate that inequality along with many of the ensuing social costs.
Surging Inequality
 By virtually any measure economic inequality has increased in recent decades. 
Between 1967 and 2007, the share of income in the U.S. going to the top quintile of 
all households increased from 43.6% to 49.7%, while the share going to the bottom 
fifth dropped from 4.0% to 3.4%.1  Since the mid 1970s, compensation for the 100 
highest paid chief executive officers increased from $1.3 million, or thirty-nine times 
the pay of the average worker, to $37.5 million, or more than 1,000 times the pay of 
a typical worker.2  In 2004, those in the top one percent enjoyed a 12.5% increase in 
their incomes compared to 1.5% for the remaining 99%.3
1. Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor & Jessica C. Smith, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007 40 (2008).
2. Paul Krugman, For Richer, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 20, 2002, at 62.
3. Paul Krugman, Editorial, Left Behind Economics, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2006, at A19.
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 Wealth, of course, has long been much more unequally distributed than income, 
and that inequality has increased over time.  Between 1983 and 2001, the share of 
wealth going to the top five percent grew from 56.1% to 59.2%.  While African 
Americans and Hispanics earn approximately two-thirds of what whites earn, wealth 
holdings for the typical non-white family are approximately one-tenth that of the 
typical white family.4
 City residents have been falling behind their suburban counterparts, and non-
white neighborhoods have been falling behind white communities.  In 1960, per 
capita income in cities was 105% that of suburbanites, but by 1990, urban residents 
were earning just 84% of those in the suburbs.5  The median census tract income for 
the typical black household in 1990 was $27,808 compared to $45,486 for whites, a 
gap of $17,679.  A similar pattern holds for Hispanics.6
 Between 1970 and 2000, the number of high poverty census tracts (those where 
40% or more of the population is poor) grew from 1177 to 2510, and the number of 
people living in those tracts grew from 4.1 million to 7.9 million.7  The isolation of 
rich and poor families is also reflected by the declining number of middle-income 
communities.8  Between 1970 and 2000, the number of middle income neighbor-
hoods (census tracts where the median family income is between 80% and 120% of 
the median family income for the metropolitan area) dropped from 58% to 41% of all 
metropolitan area neighborhoods.9  And whereas more than half of lower-income 
families lived in middle income neighborhoods in 1970, only 37% of such families 
did so in 2000.10  The share of low-income families in low-income areas grew from 
36% to 48%.11
 Even longer standing patterns of racial segregation persist.  Nationwide, the 
black/white index of dissimilarity declined from .73 to .64 between 1980 and 2000.12 
4. Thomas M. Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being African American 48–49 (2006); see also Nat’l 
Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. & Woodstock Inst., A Lifetime of Assets (2006).
5. Interwoven Destinies: Cities and the Nation 25 (Henry G. Cisneros ed., 1993); John R. Logan, 
Lewis Mumford Ctr. for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, Univ. at Albany, The 
Suburban Advantage: New Census Data Show Unyielding City-Suburb Economic Gap, and 
Surprising Shifts in Some Places (2002).
6. John R. Logan, Lewis Mumford Ctr. for Comparative Urban Regional Research, Univ. at 
Albany, Separate and Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks and Hispanics in 
Metropolitan America tbl. 1 (2002).
7. Compare Paul A. Jargowsky, Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City 34 
(1998) (reporting 1970 figures), with Paul A. Jargowsky, Brookings Inst., Stunning Progress, 
Hidden Problems: The Dramatic Decline of Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s 20 (2003).
8. Jason C. Booza, Jackie Cutsinger & George Galster, Brookings Inst., Where Did They Go? 
The Decline of Middle-Income Neighborhoods in Metropolitan America 1 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7.
12. John Iceland, Daniel H. Weinberg & Erika Steinmetz, U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and 
Ethnic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980–2000 tbl. 1 (2002).  This index 
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Scores above .60 are widely viewed as reflecting high levels of segregation.  But in 
the large metropolitan areas where the black population is most concentrated, segre-
gation levels persist at high levels reaching at or near .80 in New York, Chicago, 
Detroit, Milwaukee, and many other urban communities.  Lower levels exist pri-
marily in western and southwestern communities with small black populations.  For 
Hispanics and Asians, segregation levels are much lower, approximately .4 and .5, 
but they have remained at that level or actually increased slightly between 1980 and 
2000.13
Costs of Uneven Development
 These patterns of development have adverse consequences for metropolitan areas. 
For residents of low-income and minority communities, a range of opportunities, 
including access to financial services, is limited.
 Perhaps the most immediate costs result from both a skills and spatial mismatch. 
Those most in need of jobs (low-income residents of central city neighborhoods) lack 
the skills for, and live the greatest distance from, the areas where job growth is most 
highly concentrated.14
 Health care services are particularly unevenly distributed.  For example, in the 
aff luent and predominantly white northwest side of Washington, D.C., and the 
neighboring suburb of Bethesda, Maryland, there is one pediatrician for every 400 
children compared to one for every 3700 in the District’s predominantly poor and 
black southeast side.15  In the predominantly black and Latino South Central Los 
Angeles community there is one primary care physician for every 12,993 residents 
compared to one for every 214 in the nearby wealthy community of Bel Air.16
 The quality of public schools varies dramatically in large part because funding is 
based primarily on local property taxes.  For example, in the 2002–2003 school year 
the city of New York (where 72% of the school population was black or Hispanic and 
83% of the students were eligible for free or subsidized lunches) per pupil expendi-
varies from 0 to 1, where a score of 0 would indicate that each neighborhood had the same racial 
composition of the metropolitan area as a whole and a score of 1 would represent total segregation 
meaning every neighborhood was either all African American or all white.  Id. at 5.  For a more complete 
discussion of the index of dissimilarity, see Jeffrey M. Timberlake & John Iceland, Change in Racial and 
Ethnic Residential Inequality in American Cities, 1970–2000, 6 City & Community 335, 335–65 
(2007).
13. Iceland, Weinberg & Steinmetz, supra note 12, at tbls. 3 & 5; see also John E. Farley & Gregory D. 
Squires, Fences and Neighbors: Segregation in 21st Century America, 4 Contexts 33, 34–35 (2005).
14. See generally William J. Wilson, The Bridge over the Racial Divide: Rising Inequality and 
Coalition Politics (1999); William J. Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the 
New Urban Poor (1996); John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan 
Decentralization, 82 Q.J. Econ. 175, 179–189 (1968); John F. Kain, A Pioneer’s Perspective on the Spatial 
Mismatch Literature, 41 Urban Studies 7 (2004).
15. Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf & Todd Swanstrom, Place Matters: Metropolitics for the 
Twenty-First Century 77–78 (2d ed., rev. 2004).
16. Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society 14 
(2003).
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tures were $11,627 compared to $22,311 in suburban Manhasset (where 9% of the 
school population was black or Hispanic and 5% qualified for subsidized meals). 
Similar disparities prevail in most major metropolitan areas.17
 When tragedies occur, it is usually low-income and minority communities that 
are particularly hard hit.  Hurricane Katrina is a case in point.  Damaged areas in 
New Orleans from Katrina were 46% black and 21% poor compared to 26% and 15% 
in other neighborhoods.18  One year after the storm, 23% of blacks, compared to 
13.3% of whites, reported losing a job since Katrina hit.19  This is consistent with the 
effects of previous so-called “natural disasters.”20
 But it is not just distressed households and poor neighborhoods that pay.  Ghettos 
and barrios in the nation’s metropolitan areas undermine the political stability, social 
development, and economic growth of the entire region.  Cities with large poor 
populations and high levels of concentrated poverty pay more for a range of public 
services (including education, police, health care, and fire protection), increasing 
taxes and reducing their ability to attract middle-class families along with the re-
sources they bring.  Metropolitan areas with particularly high levels of income 
inequality grow more slowly than those where income is distributed more equally.21 
In turn, the competitiveness of the nation’s economy generally is undercut.  Uneven 
development is costly to all parts of many metropolitan areas and to the U.S. overall 
in an increasingly global world.22
Uneven Development and Financial Services
 The restructuring of financial services both reflects and reinforces these patterns 
of inequality and uneven metropolitan development.  A two-tiered system of finan-
cial services has emerged, one featuring conventional products distributed by banks 
and savings institutions primarily for middle- and upper-income, disproportionately 
white suburban markets, and the other featuring high-priced, often predatory prod-
ucts, offered by such “fringe bankers” as check-cashers, payday lenders, pawnshops, 
17. See Jonathan Kozol, The Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in 
America 321–24 (2005).
18. John R. Logan, Brown Univ., The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged 
Neighborhoods 7 (2006).
19. Louisiana Recovery Auth. Support Found., South Louisiana Recovery Survey: Citizen and 
Civic Leader Research Summary of Findings 11 (2006).
20. See Michael P. Powers, A Matter of Choice: Historical Lessons for Disaster Recovery, in There Is No Such 
Thing As a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina 13–14 (Chester Hartman 
& Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006).
21. Bruce Katz, Brookings Inst., Concentrated Poverty in New Orleans and Other American 
Cities (2008); Bruce Katz, Vice President and Dir., Metro. Policy Program, Presentation to the Fed. 
Res. Bank of New York’s “Housing in the New Marketplace” Conf.: The New Urban Demographics 
(Mar. 20, 2003).
22. See Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom, supra note 15; Dean Baker & Heather Boushey, Trends in the 
U.S. Economy: The Evolving Role of Minorities, in Segregation: The Rising Costs for America 
(James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008).
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and others targeted at low-income and predominantly minority communities con-
centrated in central cities.23
 One of the most dramatic changes in financial services has been the expansion of 
mortgage products.  Just one generation ago most borrowers applied for a conven-
tional loan and were either approved or denied.  In recent years there have been 
dozens, if not hundreds, of products available in the market place.  With the advent 
of risk-based pricing, lenders can offer an array of products priced in most cases ac-
cording to the risk borrowers pose.  So in addition to what was formerly a conventional 
or traditional fixed-rate thirty-year loan,  there are many options including interest 
only, payment optional, variable rate, and many other loan types.24  These so-called 
“nontraditional” mortgages accounted for more than one-third of all mortgage loans 
during the first nine months of 2006, compared to 2% just six years earlier.25  The 
financial and broader economic crises of recent months have translated into less ac-
cess to credit for many borrowers. Clearly, the proliferation of these new loan 
products, at least through most of 2006, has been a major contributor to what has 
become global economic turmoil. 
 A consequence of these developments has been a significant increase in high-
priced, subprime mortgage loans which enable many families with blemished credit 
records to obtain a loan and become a homeowner who, just a few years ago, would 
not have been able to do so.  There is no official definition of subprime loans, but 
basically they are loans to borrowers with blemishes on their credit records who 
could not qualify for conventional loans.  But they are higher priced loans—that is, 
they involve higher interest rates or fees—to compensate lenders for the higher risk 
involved.
 Subprime lending  expanded exponentially in recent years, increasing homeown-
ership for many families.  Between 1994 and 2005, the annual dollar volume of such 
loans grew from $35 billion to more than $600 billion.  This represented an increase 
from 5% to 20% of home-loan originations.26  Homeownership rates reached record 
levels in recent years, which many attributed to the availability of subprime loans. 
But the argument that subprime lending increased homeownership has been chal-
lenged by recent research documenting that most subprime loans are for refinancing 
rather than purchase, and the number of families losing their homes as a result of 
23. See John Caskey, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor (1994); 
Merchants of Misery: How Corporate America Profits From Poverty (Michael Hudson ed., 
1996); Howard Jacob Karger, Shortchanged: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy (2005); 
John P. Caskey, Brookings Inst., Bringing Unbanked Households into the Banking System 
(2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/capitalxchange/article10.htm; David 
Leonhardt, Two-Tiered Marketing: Companies Are Tailoring Their Products and Pitches to Two Different 
Americas, Bus. Wk., Mar. 17, 1997, at 82.
24. Allen J. Fishbein & Patrick Woodall, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Exotic or Toxic? An 
Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and Lenders 
(2006), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/showdoc.html?id=379601.
25. Kristin Downey, Mortgage Trapped, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 2007, at F1.
26. Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 
HMDA Data, 2006 Fed. Res. Bull. A123.
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default and foreclosure on these loans, which are often predatory, far exceeds the 
number who became homeowners.27
 If legitimate subprime lending has increased in recent years, it is also the case 
that many borrowers who would qualify for conventional loans are steered to even 
higher cost and often predatory loans.  While there is no official definition of a 
predatory loan, most observers recognize that loans with the following characteris-
tics are likely to be problematic:
interest rates and fees that far exceed the risk posed by the borrower;• 
loans with low initial “teaser” rates that adjust rapidly upward within two or • 
three years and quickly become unaffordable for borrowers;
high pre-payment penalties which trap many borrowers in unaffordable loans;• 
loans based on the value of the property with little regard for the borrower’s in-• 
come and, therefore, ability to repay;
loan f lipping whereby a loan is frequently refinanced, generating fees for the • 
lender but no financial benefit for the borrower;
high balloon payments; and• 
negative amortization whereby the loan balance increases as borrowers make • 
payments that are sufficient to cover only a portion of the interest but none of 
the principal that is due.28
 As a result of the debate over predatory practices, lenders were required to pub-
licly report pricing information on selected high-cost loans beginning with their 
2004 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) reports.29  The HMDA, enacted 
in 1975, requires most mortgage lenders to disclose the geographic location, income, 
race, and other information for all loan applicants as well as whether the application 
was approved or denied.  When the Federal Reserve Board analyzed pricing data at 
the time subprime lending was at or near its peak, researchers found that in 2006, 
53.7% of blacks, 46.6% of Hispanics, and 17.7% of whites received high-priced 
loans.30  In minority areas, 46.6% obtained high-priced loans compared to 21.7% in 
white communities.31
 The controversy in recent years has focused on the following questions: Has 
predatory lending increased?  Is it targeted at low-income and minority groups? 
What, if anything, should be done in response?  While there is no data specifically 
27. See, e.g., Ellen Schloemer, Wei Li, Keith Ernst & Kathleen Keest, Ctr. for Responsible 
Lending, Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to 
Homeowners (2006).
28. Elizabeth Renuart, Housing Policy Debate: Market Failures and Predatory Lending, 15 Housing Pol’y 
Debate 467 (2004).
29. See Avery, Brevoort & Canner, supra note 26, at A124.  These “selected high-cost loans” are loans where 
the annual percentage rate exceeded that for Treasury securities of comparable maturities by three 
percentage points for first lien loans and five percentage points for second lien loans.  Id. at A126.
30. Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 Fed. Res. Bull. 
A73, A95 (2007).
31. Id. at A101.
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on predatory loans, news reports, community advocacy, research, enforcement ac-
tivity pertaining to the rise, and uneven distribution of subprime loans have all 
increased dramatically in recent years.32  Clearly not all subprime loans are predatory, 
but virtually all predatory loans are in the subprime market.
 The costs of predatory lending are severe.  Families can lose their home and their 
life savings that went into purchasing the home.  Short of such a cataclysmic event, 
predatory lending still costs families a lot of money—according to one estimate $9.1 
billion each year.33  And the costs are not restricted to unfortunate individual bor-
rowers.  Many spill over into the neighborhood and metropolitan area.  Subprime 
lending is concentrated in communities with high unemployment rates and declining 
housing values, constituting both a cause and effect of those neighborhood charac-
teristics.34  Econometric research has found that the recent rise in subprime lending 
is associated with higher foreclosure rates which in turn lead to higher crime rates, 
reduced property values, and, consequently, lower tax revenues.35  To illustrate, the 
3,750 foreclosures that occurred in Chicago in 1997 and 1998 reduced property 
values in neighboring homes by over $598 million, an average of $159,000 per fore-
closure.36
 The Federal Reserve reported that 2.11% of residential mortgage loans held by 
banks were delinquent at the end of 2006, the highest rate since 2002 and at least 
twice as high as just one year earlier.  Accordingly, real estate foreclosure filings have 
also been high.  In April 2007, real estate foreclosure filings were up 62% over the 
1.26 million filings in 2006, with more than two million households projected to 
lose their homes before the current mortgage crisis is over.37  Several small lenders 
have failed, and large investors are shying away from investments backed by sub-
prime loans.  The explosive subprime mortgage market turned many mortgage 
bankers and brokers into millionaires seemingly overnight.  When the Dow lost 
32. See Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd 
(D-Conn.), Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs); Chester Hartman, 
Predatoriness, and What We Can Do About It, in Why the Poor Pay More: How to Stop Predatory 
Lending 203, 204 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2004) (citing a recent General Accounting Office report); 
Kristopher M. Rengert, Editor’s Introduction: Market Failures and Predatory Lending, 15 Housing Pol’y 
Debate 449 (2004).
33. Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, The Best Value in the Subprime 
Market: State Predatory Lending Reforms 2 (2006).
34. Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime Lending in the Primary and Secondary Markets, 13 J. of Housing 
Res. 31 (2002).
35. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 Housing Pol’y Debate 57 (2006); Dan Immergluck & 
Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 Housing 
Stud. 851 (2006); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, Measuring the Effect of Subprime Lending on 
Neighborhood Foreclosures: Evidence from Chicago, 40 Urb. Aff. Rev. 362 (2005).
36. Immergluck & Smith, supra note 35, at 57.
37. Peter G. Miller, 2 Million Foreclosure Filings in 2007?, RealtyTrac, May 31, 2007, http://www.
realtytrac.com/contentmanagement.
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more than 400 points one day in March 2007, over 200 points a couple of weeks later 
in that month, another 1,000 points in early August and another 4,000 points in 
2008, at least a portion of those losses were attributable to growing problems in the 
subprime mortgage industry.  And future declines were predicted by many due to 
continuing problems in the mortgage market.38  But even these macro-economic ef-
fects are harshest in depressed communities, particularly the Gulf Coast and 
industrial Midwest.  Subprime foreclosure rates in the fourth quarter of 2006 ranged 
from less than 3% in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia, to over 7% in 
Mississippi and over 9% in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.39
 Borrowers and their communities are taking great risks and paying substantial 
costs from recent developments in the mortgage market.  That is less true for the 
industry.  Originators can charge higher interest rates and fees, thus building addi-
tional risk into their business plans.  Today most loans are sold in the secondary 
market, then packaged as securities and sold to investors.  Risks, consequently, are 
spread across several actors.  Again, when priced appropriately, originators and inves-
tors have profited from the proliferation of mortgage loans as many households and 
their neighbors have suffered.40  The question remains: what should be done about 
the emerging two-tiered financial services industry and uneven development gener-
ally?
Past, Present, and Future Policy
 Uneven development of the nation’s metropolitan areas and inequities in housing 
and housing finance markets reflect a range of public policies and private industry 
practices.  Among the factors that have structured the nation’s housing markets, par-
ticularly the racial and economic composition of neighborhoods, are the following: 
intimidation and violence by neighborhood “improvement” societies to maintain • 
the “character” of communities;
explicitly discriminatory policies that virtually excluded non-whites from FHA • 
and other government insured loan programs from the 1930s into the 1960s and 
fueled suburban development at the expense of central cities;
refusal of real estate and rental agents to provide similar levels of service to white • 
and non-white clients including steering of clients to communities based on their 
race and that of the neighborhoods;
38. Vikas Bajaj, Freddie Mac Tightens Standards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2007, at C1; Vikas Bajaj & Mark 
Lander, Mortgage Losses Echo in Europe and on Wall St., N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2007, at A1; Julie Creswell 
& Vikas Bajaj, A Mortgage Crisis Begins to Spiral, and the Casualties Mount, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2007, at 
C1, C4.
39. David Cho & Nell Henderson, Where the Wolf Comes Knocking; Areas Already in Economic Distress Feel 
Rise in Housing Foreclosures Most, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 2007, at D1.
40. Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions and 
Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 4–7 (2007) (statement of Allen J. 
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America).
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redlining by financial institutions (including the refusal to provide financing for • 
many years and predatory lending more recently);
concentration of public housing complexes in inner city ghettos and barrios; and• 
exclusionary zoning ordinances in most suburbs that limit or prohibit multi-• 
family housing and other affordable housing units.41
 Individuals and families do make choices, but in a context not of their own 
choosing.  It is unlikely that any progress will be made in addressing the inequitable 
access to financial services or exploitative practices generally if the structural sources 
of inequality are not addressed.  If public policies and private practices have shaped 
the uneven development of metropolitan areas, including uneven access to financial 
services, then alternative policies and practices can ameliorate those patterns.
 Several politically feasible tools are available to respond to the overall surge in 
inequality.  For example, the federal minimum wage should be indexed to take into 
consideration the cost of living so that the recent increase that was approved in May 
2007 does not continue to lose buying power as it has since the moment it went into 
effect in July 2007.42  Living wage ordinances, which mandate even higher wages, 
generally $8 to $10 per hour, frequently with fringe benefits, have been enacted in 
more than 100 jurisdictions with these rules applying to government contractors and 
recipients of economic development subsidies.43  More jurisdictions should follow 
this lead.  The Earned Income Tax Credit could be expanded to lift more working 
families out of poverty.44  Enacting the Employee Free Choice Act, which allows 
workers to form a union when more than 50% of workers sign a card indicating their 
desire to do so in lieu of secret elections, would strengthen the role of unions in the 
U.S. and their positive impact on wage inequality.45  A more provocative proposal, 
the Income Equity Act, has been offered by former Minnesota Representative Martin 
Sabo and would deny corporations tax deductions on any executive compensation 
exceeding twenty-five times the pay of the firm’s lowest paid workers.46
41. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States 
(1985); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
Making of the Underclass (1993); David Rusk, Inside Game Outside Game: Winning 
Strategies for Saving Urban America (1999); The Geography of Opportunity: Race and 
Housing Choice in Metropolitan America 8 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
42. See generally John Atlas & Peter Dreier, Waging Victory, Am. Prospect, Nov. 10, 2006, http://www.
prospect.org/cs/articles?article=waging_victory; Neal Peirce, Congress’ Minimum Wage Vote: Prelude to a 
Better Politics?, Stateline.org, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.statel ine.org/l ive/detai ls/
story?contentID=174954.
43. Peter Dreier, Community Organizing for What? Progressive Politics and Movement Building in America, in 
Transforming the City: Community Organizing and the Challenge of Political Change 
237 (Marion Orr ed., 2007).
44. See Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein & Sylvia Allegretto, The State of Working America, 
2004/2005 13 (2005).
45. See Thomas Kochan & Beth Shulman, Econ. Policy Inst., A New Social Contract: Restoring 
Dignity and Balance to the Economy 14, 14–16 (2007).
46. Peirce, supra note 42.
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 Expansion of several housing and land use policies would also reduce inequality. 
Inclusionary zoning laws that require developers to set aside a specific share of 
housing units to meet affordable housing objectives have been implemented in dozens 
of cities.47  Tax-based revenue sharing, whereby a portion of the increasing property 
tax revenues in prosperous neighborhoods is used to invest in housing and other 
community development initiatives in distressed areas, has been implemented in 
Minnesota.48  Mobility programs have enabled thousands of families to leave ghettos 
and barrios for more prosperous outlying urban and suburban communities where 
they found safer neighborhoods, better schools, and better job prospects.49
 Policies directed specifically at financial service providers are also required. 
Electronic banking makes it more cost-effective for mainstream institutions to serve 
the unbanked and out-compete the fringe bankers.  Carefully targeted financial in-
centives, including tax breaks or CRA credit (see below), would encourage more 
banks to do so.50  Community development finance institutions, which received in-
centives to serve traditionally underserved markets, appear to be doing just that. 
Such initiatives should be expanded.51
 While financial literacy programs for consumers are helpful,52 more aggressive 
efforts to redirect the activities of mainstream financial institutions are essential to 
complement the efforts of alternative services, along with newfound consumer edu-
cation.  The CRA, a federal ban on redlining that requires mortgage lenders to 
ascertain and be responsive to the credit needs of their entire service areas, including 
low- and moderate-income communities, should be strengthened to provide sanc-
tions for those that engage in predatory practices and credit for those that pursue 
equitable lending in their communities.  Lender CRA records are taken into consid-
eration when they submit applications to their regulators to merge with or purchase 
another institution or make any significant change in their business operation. 
Evaluation of CRA performance and its impact on such applications should reflect 
efforts to provide fair, equitable credit and to combat predatory lending.  Currently 
47. Rusk, supra note 41 (arguing that state legislatures must set new “rules of the game” requiring housing 
policies to ensure that all new developments have their fair share of low- and moderate-income 
housing).
48. Myron Orfield, American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality (2002).
49. John Goering & Judith D. Feins, Choosing a Better Life?: Evaluating the Moving to 
Opportunity Social Experiment (2003); Alexander Polikoff, Waiting for Gautreaux: A 
Story of Segregation, Housing, and the Black Ghetto (2006); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & 
James E. Rosenbaum, Crossing the Class and Color Lines: From Public Housing to White 
Suburbia (2000).
50. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 121, 221–36 (2004).
51. See Howard Karger, Shortchanges: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy (2005).
52. Id.; Home Mortgage Data: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the 
H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Douglas Duncan, Senior Vice 
President, Research and Business Development and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Association).
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the CRA applies only to federally-chartered depositories (e.g., banks and thrifts).53 
This statute should be expanded to cover credit unions, independent mortgage 
bankers, insurers, and other entities that now account for well over half of all mort-
gage loans.  The Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2007, introduced 
by Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-Tex.) and Luis Gutierrrz (D-Ill.), would accomplish 
this objective.  In addition, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which facilitates 
enforcement of CRA, should be expanded to include pricing information on all 
loans.54
 A strong national anti-predatory lending law should also be enacted.  Currently 
thirty-six states and Washington, D.C., along with seventeen other local jurisdic-
tions have such laws, leaving most consumers in other states less protected.55
 No doubt, more aggressive enforcement of fair housing and fair lending laws 
would also increase fair access to credit and banking services generally.56  More pro-
vocatively, federal subsidies for homeownership (e.g., income tax deductions for 
mortgage interest and property taxes paid) could be withheld in segregated commu-
nities until their racial composition more closely approximated the region of which 
they are a part, thus making the fact of segregation, rather than the presence of non-
whites, the problem to be solved.57
 A more fundamental change would be to place a duty of suitability on lenders 
requiring them to recommend loan products that are most appropriate for borrowers 
given their financial situation (reducing the likelihood of default and foreclosure), 
similar to rules that currently apply to securities brokers and financial planners. 
This, in essence, would shift at least some of the burden from individual consumers 
to lenders themselves to assure compliance with fair lending and anti-predatory 
lending rules.  Some states are already moving in this direction by prohibiting those 
loan products and services that do not provide a net tangible benefit to the borrow-
ers.58
53. See Richard Marsico, The 2004–2005 Amendments to the Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: For 
Communities, One Step Forward and Three Steps Back, 39 Clearinghouse Rev. 534, 534–45 (2006).
54. See John Taylor & Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Forward, 53 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 203 (2008).  Rep. Johnson and Rep. Gutierrez plan to introduce the Community 
Reinvestment Act Modernization Act of 2009 in January 2009.  “Dear Colleague” e-mail from Rep. 
Eddie Bernice Johnson to John Taylor, President and CEO of the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition (Nov. 19, 2008) (on file with New York Law School Law Review).
55. Subprime and Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions, and Effects on 
Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Steve Antonakes, 
Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks); see also Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Suitability—Don’t 
Turn Back the Clock on Fair Lending and Homeownership Gains 11 (2007).
56. See generally Stephen Ross & John Yinger, The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination, 
Research Methodology, and Fair-Lending Enforcement 15–95 (2002).
57. See James W. Loewen, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism 442–46 
(2006).
58. See Steve Covington, Predatory Lending’s New Frontier, Mortgage Banking, Sept. 2005, http://www.
mbaa.org/files/Conferences/2006/Non-Prime/PredatoryLendingsNewFrontier.pdf; see also Kathleen 
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 In recent years several community groups and national membership organiza-
tions and networks have effectively challenged and changed the behavior of the 
financial services industry.  Groups like the Association of Community Organizations 
for Reform Now (“ACORN”), the National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
(“NCRC”), the National Training and Information Center (“NTIC”), the National 
Fair Housing Alliance (“NFHA”), and others have secured access to financial ser-
vices for markets that have long been underserved or exploited by the industry.59  For 
example, ACORN estimated that between 1995 and 2004 it generated more than $6 
billion for low-income communities through its CRA organizing efforts and another 
$6 billion from its anti-predatory lending campaigns.60  Adding its work to create 
living wage ordinances, develop affordable housing, and reform various public ser-
vices, ACORN pegs its return to low-income communities at more than $15 billion.61 
Using leverage provided by the federal Community Reinvestment Act, the NCRC 
estimates that more than $4.7 trillion in new loans have been secured for low-income 
and minority markets since the statute was enacted in 1977 largely in response to 
community organizing efforts.62  Under authority provided by the FHA, the NFHA 
estimated that non-profit advocacy groups generated $225 million for plaintiffs since 
1990.
 But future advances will likely require even stronger coalitions.  There are a 
number of logical partners that come to mind, some of whom are already working 
with these community organizations.  Organized labor, church groups, members of 
the local media, some elected officials (e.g., mayors whose cities are losing tax reve-
nues from predatory lending), foundations, and many others have begun to collaborate 
in effective efforts to extend recent successes in democratizing access to financial 
services.63
 In what may be a sign of things to come, in January 2008, the city of Baltimore 
sued Wells Fargo Bank for targeting minority neighborhoods for predatory loans, 
thus constituting the first lawsuit filed by a municipality seeking to recover the costs 
associated with the resulting high foreclosure rates caused by such racially discrimi-
natory lending practices (e.g., lost tax revenues, added fire and police costs, court 
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 
Tex. L. Rev. 1255, 1281–84 (2002); Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 
Akron L. Rev. 725, 725–39 (2005).
59. Organizing Access to Capital: Advocacy and the Democratization of Financial 
Institutions (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2002).
60. Lisa Ranghelli, ACORN, The Monetary Impact of ACORN Campaigns: A Ten-Year 
Retrospective, 1995–2004 12 (2006), available at http://www.acorn.org/f ileadmin/Reports/
ACORN_Wins_Report.pdf.
61. Id. at 2.
62. See Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act 5 
(2007), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Our_Region/Community_Development.
63. See Peter Dreier, The Future of Community Reinvestment: Challenges and Opportunities in a Changing 
Environment, 69 J. Am. Planning Ass’n 341, 342 (2003).
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administrative costs, social programs to maintain healthy neighborhoods, etc.).64 
Cleveland followed by suing twenty-one financial institutions for f looding the local 
housing market with subprime loans to people who could never repay, leading to a 
foreclosure crisis costing the city millions of dollars to maintain boarded-up homes 
and respond to increases in arson and other violent crimes.  Whereas Baltimore is 
suing loan originators, Cleveland is suing financial institutions involved in mort-
gage-related investment activity.65
 The financial crises that many families (poor, working-class, and even middle-
income) face are inextricably linked to broader forces of uneven development.  The 
public policies and private practices that have generated these outcomes are no secret. 
Neither are at least some of the remedies.
64. See Complaint, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, No. LO8CV 062 (4th 
Cir. Jan. 8, 2008).
65. Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders over the Subprime Mortgages, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2008, at 
A9.
